Team: Huntress Managed Identity Threat Detection and Response (ITDR)
Product: Microsoft 365, Microsoft Entra ID
Environment: Microsoft 365 (Microsoft Entra ID), Huntress Platform
Summary: Learn how Microsoft Entra ID Conditional Access policies and Huntress Managed ITDR work together to protect cloud identities, how Huntress automates adversary infrastructure blocking, and how to coordinate travel exceptions across both platforms.
In This Article
Summary Table
How Conditional Access and Managed ITDR Interact
What Huntress Creates in Your Tenant
What Huntress Surfaces
What Huntress Does Not Surface
Planned Travel
The March 2026 Railway Policy
Frequently Asked Questions
Related Articles
Summary Table
The following table summarizes the key operational differences and responsibilities between self-authored Microsoft Entra ID Conditional Access policies and Huntress Managed ITDR.
| Feature or Scenario | Your Conditional Access Policies (Microsoft Entra ID) | Huntress Managed ITDR |
|---|---|---|
| Blocks sign-ins by country, device compliance, or user risk | Yes, configured and maintained by your administrators. | No. |
| Blocks sign-ins from confirmed adversary infrastructure | Only if your team manually builds and updates custom IP address ranges. | Yes, in eligible opted-in tenants, through Huntress-managed policies that Huntress keeps current. |
| Detects suspicious activity after a successful sign-in | No. Conditional Access evaluates signals only during initial authentication. | Yes, continuously monitored 24/7 by the Huntress SOC. |
| Reports sign-ins that were blocked | No. Block events remain in your Entra sign-in logs without triggering an alert. | Yes, for blocks enforced by Huntress-managed policies. |
| Reports failed sign-in attempts or password spraying | No. | No. These events do not generate incident reports but are searchable in Huntress SIEM. |
| Reads or modifies policies across systems | No. Entra ID does not inspect or interact with Huntress detection rules. | Huntress never reads, edits, or deletes your self-authored policies. Huntress maintains only objects prefixed with [HUNTRESS]. |
| Requires manual travel configuration | Yes. You must adjust your location-based Conditional Access rules. | Yes, by adding a temporary Expected rule in the Huntress Platform. Huntress-managed policies block specific threat infrastructure rather than geographic regions, so travel does not trigger them. |
How Conditional Access and Managed ITDR Interact
Conditional Access policies are rules configured in Microsoft Entra ID to secure access to your organization's cloud applications. These policies block or allow authentication based on context such as device compliance, physical location, or real-time identity risk. For example, you can block all sign-ins originating outside approved countries or enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for high-risk access attempts.
Huntress Managed Identity Threat Detection and Response (ITDR) is a 24/7 managed security service that evaluates Microsoft 365 identity activity. ITDR monitors for post-authentication compromise indicators, including unusual sign-in behaviors, malicious inbox rule changes, and unauthorized privilege escalation.
Huntress Managed ITDR and Microsoft Conditional Access policies function together as complementary security layers:
- Conditional Access policies serve as a preventive control. They evaluate authentication requests at the perimeter and block unauthorized access before a user interacts with cloud resources.
- Huntress Managed ITDR serves as a detective and response control. It analyzes successful authentications and subsequent session activity. When suspicious behavior occurs, the Huntress SOC investigates, reports, and initiates remediation actions.
- Adversary Infrastructure adds automated prevention. When the Huntress SOC identifies hosting, proxy, or relay infrastructure during an active investigation, detection engineers validate those IP addresses against legitimate fleet-wide traffic. Huntress then deploys targeted blocking policies to all eligible, opted-in tenants. An incident identified in one partner tenant creates immediate preventive protection for every partner tenant.
What Huntress Creates in Your Tenant
To deliver automated adversary blocking, Huntress creates three specific object types within your Microsoft Entra ID tenant. Each object includes the [HUNTRESS] prefix to distinguish it from your self-authored rules:
- One IP named location per campaign, marked as not trusted. It holds the blocked addresses in CIDR form.
- One blocking policy per campaign, applied to all users and all cloud apps, scoped only to that named location.
- One empty security group,
[HUNTRESS] CAP - Emergency Access Exclusion, shared by every Huntress policy. Add your break glass accounts to this group once and every current and future Huntress policy honors it.
Tenant Safety and Policy Boundaries
Huntress operates under strict architectural boundaries to safeguard partner configurations:
- Huntress never modifies, disables, deletes, or rescopes any policy, named location, or security group created by your team.
- Huntress never inspects or evaluates your self-authored policies to determine whether to escalate a security signal.
- Huntress never disables Microsoft Security Defaults.
Microsoft Entra ID evaluates each Conditional Access policy independently, and an enforcement block from any policy takes precedence. A Huntress-managed policy only adds a block against confirmed adversary infrastructure. It cannot weaken your existing MFA requirements, bypass device health standards, or grant access that your own policies restrict.
How Policies Stay Current
Huntress publishes new threat campaigns and updates IP address ranges continuously as adversary infrastructure shifts. Policy updates propagate to connected tenants within one business day.
An automated daily check audits Huntress-created objects in each tenant against reference baselines to repair configuration drift. If an administrator disables or alters a Huntress-managed policy in Entra ID, the daily check restores the policy to its expected configuration. If you need to stop enforcement, turn off the Adversary Infrastructure feature for that organization in the Huntress Platform rather than editing the policy in Microsoft Entra ID.
What Huntress Surfaces
Huntress Managed ITDR provides actionable context and alerting across several key authentication and post-authentication scenarios:
Successful sign-ins
Huntress monitors successful Microsoft 365 authentications, evaluating user context, device characteristics, and geographic anomalies.
Suspicious post-authentication activity
Huntress detects unauthorized changes made after sign-in, including malicious forwarding rules, permission escalation, and rogue credential registrations.
Anomalous access patterns
Huntress flags and investigates authentications originating from unexpected countries or through commercial VPNs and anonymizing proxies.
Sign-ins blocked by Huntress-managed policies
In eligible, opted-in tenants, Huntress monitors your Entra sign-in logs for blocks triggered by its Adversary Infrastructure policies. When an adversary attempts authentication using valid user credentials from blocked infrastructure, Huntress issues a low-severity incident report. This alert gives administrators the opportunity to rotate the compromised password before the threat actor attempts access from unblocked infrastructure.
What Huntress Does Not Surface
To maintain high signal fidelity and avoid alert fatigue, Huntress does not generate incident reports for the following scenarios:
Sign-ins blocked by your self-authored policies
If an unauthorized user attempts authentication and is stopped by your custom Conditional Access rules, Huntress does not alert on the event unless the user subsequently authenticates from an allowed location or compliant device.
Failed sign-in attempts
Huntress does not generate incident reports for incorrect password attempts or high-volume credential-stuffing attacks. These raw events are queryable in Huntress SIEM and provide contextual data for SOC analysts during active investigations.
Custom policy configurations
Huntress does not read, parse, or evaluate your custom Conditional Access rules.
Planned Travel
When an end user travels or signs in from an unfamiliar location, administrators must adjust configurations in both Microsoft Entra ID and the Huntress Platform. Because Huntress does not synchronize with your Conditional Access policies or travel exceptions, changes made in Entra ID do not transfer to Huntress. Plan to configure both platforms before the travel window begins.
Huntress-managed Adversary Infrastructure policies block only confirmed attacker hosting, relay, and proxy IP addresses, and not countries or geographic regions. Legitimate traveling users are not blocked by Huntress policies, and administrators do not need to add travel exceptions to Huntress-managed Entra policies. Travel exceptions apply only to your self-authored location rules in Entra ID and to Expected rules in the Huntress Platform.
In Microsoft Entra ID (Conditional Access)
Update your location-based Conditional Access policies in Microsoft Entra ID to maintain user access during travel:
- Add a temporary travel exception. Update your location-based policies or named locations to permit authentication from the user's destination country or specific IP address range for the duration of the trip.
- Remove the exception after travel. Remove the travel exception when the user returns to restore your baseline access restrictions.
In Huntress Managed ITDR
Configure the Huntress Platform to prevent unwanted access escalations while maintaining active threat detection:
- Create a temporary Expected rule. In the Huntress Platform, add an Expected rule specifying the user and their travel destination, and set an expiration date. This suppresses unwanted access notifications for expected travel while keeping active threat detection in place.
- Dismiss existing travel escalations. If an escalation was generated before creating the rule, review and dismiss it. Huntress will not generate new escalations for that user in the specified location while the Expected rule remains active.
Best Practices for Travel and Exceptions
Follow these administrative best practices to maintain a balanced security posture during travel:
Coordinate system updates
Update both your Entra Conditional Access policies and Huntress Expected rules during the same maintenance window.
Enforce expiration dates
Always configure an end date for travel exceptions in both platforms to prevent permanent security gaps.
Establish clear travel notification procedures
Instruct end users to notify IT administrators in advance of domestic or international travel.
Investigate unexpected alerts
If you receive an escalation for a traveling user, check whether an Expected rule expired or was omitted before dismissing the notification.
Tip: For organizations with frequent business travelers, consider grouping users in Microsoft Entra ID and applying dynamic group-based Conditional Access policies. In the Huntress Platform, creating bulk Expected rules across multiple countries or batches of individual users is not currently supported.
The March 2026 Railway Policy
Some Microsoft 365 tenants still contain a legacy policy named [HUNTRESS] Block - Confirmed Adversary Infrastructure and its associated named location. Huntress deployed this static rule in March 2026 in response to the Railway campaign. Huntress no longer updates this policy. The dynamic Adversary Infrastructure campaign policies serve as its maintained replacement.
Frequently Asked Questions
If a sign-in is blocked by Conditional Access, does Huntress report it?
Reporting depends on which system enforced the block. Blocks by your self-authored policies do not generate incident reports, though you can search those events in Huntress SIEM. Blocks enforced by a Huntress-managed Adversary Infrastructure policy generate a low-severity incident report detailing the targeted identity, source IP address, and threat campaign.
Can a Huntress policy lock out a legitimate user?
No. Huntress policies contain only IP addresses confirmed during active security incidents and validated against legitimate traffic across the Huntress fleet. Legitimate infrastructure—including residential ISPs, corporate VPN/SASE endpoints, and major cloud providers—is strictly excluded. If you suspect a legitimate sign-in was blocked, contact Huntress Support with the targeted identity and timestamp. Do not edit the policy in Entra ID, as automated daily drift repair will restore it. You can turn off Adversary Infrastructure for that organization in the Huntress Platform while Support investigates.
How should I protect emergency break-glass accounts?
Add your emergency accounts to the [HUNTRESS] CAP - Emergency Access Exclusion security group in Microsoft Entra ID. Every Huntress-managed policy automatically excludes this group.
Why doesn't my tenant display Huntress policies despite meeting prerequisites?
Verify that Microsoft Security Defaults is turned off, the Microsoft 365 integration status displays healthy in the Huntress Platform, and Adversary Infrastructure is enabled for that organization. New campaigns deploy to canary tenants first, so fleet-wide propagation can take up to one business day.
If I disable a Huntress policy in Entra ID, why does it turn back on?
Automated daily checks compare tenant objects against template baselines and restore any disabled or modified configurations. To suspend enforcement without interference from drift repair, disable Adversary Infrastructure for that organization in the Huntress Platform.
What happens if a threat actor signs in from an allowed location?
If an attacker authenticates through an allowed location or compliant device, Huntress Managed ITDR monitors the session and alerts on suspicious post-authentication activity, such as inbox forwarding rules or privilege changes.
Can Huntress suppress escalations based on my Entra Conditional Access policies?
No. Huntress does not inspect or interpret your custom Conditional Access rules. Administrators must manage exclusions and Expected rules in each platform independently.
How do I resolve repeated escalations for legitimate travel?
Create an Expected rule in the Huntress Platform specifying the user's travel destination and dates, then dismiss any active escalations related to the travel event.
Are failed sign-in attempts or credential-stuffing attacks reported?
Huntress does not generate incident reports or escalations for failed sign-ins or attempts stopped by Conditional Access to avoid alert fatigue. To investigate these events, run custom queries in Huntress SIEM. Review our guide on ITDR queries in Huntress SIEM and our guide on managing saved queries.
Related Articles
How to Create an Unwanted Access Rule
ITDR: Unwanted Access Overview
(Microsoft 365) Huntress Identity Isolation for ITDR
Huntress Managed ISPM - Disable or Revert a Policy After Microsoft Account Access Issues